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Abstract
An attempt has been made in this paper to examine the impact of international remittances on poverty and 
income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In carrying out the study, 34 SSA countries for which relevant 
data are available, between 1980 and 2009, were sampled for the poverty analysis whilst a sample size of 36 
was used in the remittances-income inequality exploration. A set of dynamic panel-data models was estimated 
using system Generalized Method of Moments. It was found that remittances have significant poverty-alleviating 
effect, with the poorest of the poor being the least beneficiaries. Additionally, International remittances have 
income equalisation effects in countries with relatively narrower income gap, but with an intensifying income-
inequality aggravating effects in countries with relatively wider income gap. It is, thus, concluded that although 
remittances have huge potentials to alleviate poverty and equilibrate incomes in SSA, these remittances have 
size-effects to the detriment of relatively poorer countries and countries with relatively higher income gap. 
Therefore, the paper recommends that, although the poverty-alleviating effects and income equalisation effects 
of remittances cannot be downplayed, it is imprudent for SSA policymakers to overly exclusively on remittances 
as a poverty-reduction strategy towards sustainable socioeconomic development of the sub-region.
Keywords: Remittances, Poverty, Inequality, Developing Countries, system GMM, Sub-
Saharan Africa
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3Introduction
International migration and its consequential effects on socioeconomic transformation of 
labour-exporting countries have received the most attention from academics, policymakers 
and researchers in the area of development economics and finance in this current era of 
globalization. The upsurge of research interest on international migrant remittances, in 
particular, is not surprising given the magnitude and stability in the positive growth trend over 
the past three decades. There is one other important reason why a lot of policy-research on the 
implications of remittances for economic development might have dominated related studies 
on other forms of development finance since the recognition of remittances as an alternative 
source of development finance three decades ago. Unlike all other forms of development 
finance, remittances have a direct impact on the economy of a recipient-country at 
disintegrated levels – household, community, and nationwide. Consequently, the direct 
linkages of remittances and socioeconomic development can be explored at three possible 
levels – micro, meso, and macro (Adenutsi 2010). 
At the micro level, remittances are a major source of additional income for sustenance 
of remittance-receiving households and capital for small and medium-scale enterprises 
(SMEs). Unlike aid, remittances flow directly to individual households and institutions; and 
unlike loans they attract no direct interest and repayment obligations. Besides contributing to 
increased consumption in the short run by empowering recipients to pay for food, clothes, 
shelter, healthcare, utility bills, funerals, festivals, and so on, remittances can propel longer-
term development process through investment in education, vocational training, land, 
housing, and SMEs. At the meso level, local communities can benefit from essential social 
amenities such as the roads, educational facilities, and healthcare facilities, initiated and 
funded by overseas-based associations of native migrants. Associations of migrants can also 
mobilise funding through non-governmental organisations and other development-oriented 
4civil society organisations in support of important social projects such as vaccination against 
communicable diseases and the provision of potable water in their local communities back 
home. In this case, besides the indirect trickling down effects, families without international 
migrants can also benefit directly from an outcome of international migration at the meso 
level.
At the macro level, international remittances are an essential source of foreign 
exchange, as they augment international reserves thereby helping low-income countries 
through macroeconomic stabilization by ameliorating their perennial balance of payments 
(BoP) problems. Remittance inflows are also countercyclical as they increase during 
economic downturns; hence they contribute significantly absorbing various forms of negative 
natural and macroeconomic shocks in labour-exporting countries. For instance, international 
evidences have shown that remittance inflows have always increased in disaster- and conflict-
inflicted countries (Clarke and Wallsten 2004; Yang and Choi 2007). Besides, remittance 
inflows have consistently remained the most resilient form of private external capital during
global financial crises and violent conflicts in labour-exporting developing countries. Again, 
remittance inflows are more equally spread among developing countries than any other form 
of private capital. On the reverse side, remittances may contribute to destabilizing the 
macroeconomy of labour-exporting countries by sparking inflation and worsening BoP 
problems in import-dependent small-open economies where domestic output often falls short 
of aggregate demand.
Even though developing countries have been the largest recipients of international 
remittances ever since they were recognized as an important alternative source of 
development finance in low-income countries, high incidence of poverty in the developing 
world still persists, with SSA remaining the poorest among the poor. The evidence for the 
apparent perpetuation of poverty and inequality in the developing world is certainly a 
5fundamental reason why the world decided to set poverty reduction as the first and foremost 
priority target under the Millennium Development Goals in the year 2000. So, is it the case 
that remittances fail to impact on poverty and inequality in developing countries that are too 
poor? This paper, therefore, seeks to contribute to filling this research gap by: (i) determining
the impact of remittances on poverty headcount, poverty gap, poverty severity, and income 
inequality in SSA; and (ii) verifying if the effects of remittances on poverty and income 
inequality vary according to the severity of poverty and inequality among SSA countries. 
Following this introduction are some stylized facts in Section 2. Then, the review of 
the literature is undertaken in Section 3. Specification of the empirical model, and discussion 
of issues related to methodology and data are presented in Section 4. The empirical results are 
presented and discussed in Section 5, whilst Section 6 concludes with some policy 
recommendations.
Some stylized facts
Figure 1 Panel A reveals that between 1980 and 2009, real GDP at purchasing power parity 
(PPP) per capita (symbolized Y) has been relatively stagnant until the latter part of the 2000s. 
During this same period, remittances have been increasing steadily and robustly, especially 
from the 1990s, whilst all the three indicators of poverty (headcount (PovH), gap (PovG) and 
severity (PovS))1 increased and only started to decline after mid-1990s. Even though the 
incidence and severity of poverty are beginning to reduce in more recent years, the levels are 
still relatively high in the 2000s when compared with the indicators of the 1980s. In other 
words, current poverty levels have only fallen slightly below the levels that prevailed in the 
1980s. Thus, by matching the trends in poverty against the trends in income levels and 
remittances received, it can be observed that there is a somewhat inverse relationship between 
6poverty and remittances just like the relationship between poverty and real GDP PPP per 
capita.
Figure 1: The Remittance-Poverty Nexus in SSA, 1980-2009
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Figure 1 Panel B confirms earlier observation that there is a strong negative correlation 
between remittances per capita received and poverty (-0.78, -0.70 and -0.76 for PovH, PovG 
and PovS respectively) with a stronger negative relationship between remittances per capita
and real GDP PPP per capita. By implication, assuming the correlation is actually a one-
directional the causal effect from remittances then remittances had a strong poverty-
alleviating effect in SSA over the past three decades.
In Table 1, the 36 sampled SSA countries are ranked according to remittances per 
capita received in recent years, 2000-2009. An important observation is that, with the 
exception of Togo, Uganda, Mali, and Guinea-Bissau, generally, countries ranked as highest 
remittance-recipients are also countries with the highest per capita income within the sub-
region. This holds for the countries ranked as the least remittance-recipients. More 
specifically, whereas the countries ranked at the upper semi (1st-18th highest recipients) have 
average real GDP PPP per capita of US$3,884.02 with a corresponding US$61.90 remittances 
7per capita, those ranked at the bottom semi (19th-36th) recorded average of US$2,089.97 and 
US$4.03 respectively.
Table 1: Remittances Received and Income Status of SSA Countries, 2000-2009
GDP per capita PPP GDP per capita PPP
Rank Country (remittances per capita in US$) (constant 2005 US$) Rank Country (remittances per capita in US$) (constant 2005 US$)
1 Cape Verde (249.88) 2,714.64                 19 Sao Tome & Principe (9.62) 1,420.32                 
2 Mauritius (170.62) 10,235.56               20 Cote d'Ivoire (8.08) 1,591.94                 
3 Lesotho (168.66) 1,221.92                 21 Guinea (7.07) 935.12                    
4 Seychelles (89.09) 17,953.95               22 Namibia (6.59) 5,296.28                 
5 Swaziland (71.37) 4,294.24                 23 Gabon (5.97) 13,125.41               
6 Senegal (64.91) 1,568.52                 24 Cameroon (5.21) 1,942.17                 
7 Botswana (42.74) 11,481.19               25 Sierra Leone (4.28) 620.77                    
8 Sudan (38.31) 1,634.52                 26 Niger (3.86) 613.90                    
9 Togo (31.15) 777.52                    27 Burkina Faso (3.85) 1,013.92                 
10 Nigeria (30.56) 1,697.17                 28 Ghana (3.76) 1,197.68                 
11 Gambia (30.31) 1,152.99                 29 Congo, Rep. (3.53) 3,457.62                 
12 Kenya (26.20) 1,342.15                 30 Mozambique (3.44) 656.35                    
13 Comoros (20.20) 1,105.51                 31 Rwanda (3.11) 845.71                    
14 Benin (19.59) 1,322.06                 32 Ethiopia (2.16) 644.78                    
15 Mali (18.14) 968.39                    33 Madagascar (0.78) 895.14                    
16 Guinea-Bissau (15.59) 995.04                    34 Mauritania (0.68) 1,688.52                 
17 Uganda (14.60) 914.28                    35 Tanzania (0.37) 1,044.25                 
18 South Africa (12.31) 8,532.65                 36 Malawi (0.07) 629.52                    
Source: Author based on World Bank (2011)
Indeed, the very poorest SSA countries in terms of GDP PPP per capita (Niger, Sierra Leone, 
Malawi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Madagascar) are also countries with the least 
receipt of remittances per capita. This trend is inconsistent with the argument that remittances 
flow more to poorer countries. The trend appears to justify the position of the remittance-
pessimists that because the very poor cannot afford to finance international migration, they 
receive lower remittances; implying remittances can exacerbate income inequality depending 
upon some underlying features of the labour-exporting countries.
Literature review
From theoretical and empirical literature, there is less controversy concerning the positive 
effects of remittances on poverty in labour-exporting countries unlike the possible conflicting 
effects on income inequality. The main theoretical debate has been that it is only households 
8with relatively higher incomes that can afford to finance the cost of international migration
and to enable them earn remittances (Lipton 1980; Stahl 1982). Therefore, remittances can 
widen income inequality among households in low-income labour-exporting countries. This 
poses a challenge to policymakers, given that, income inequality, through a number of 
mechanisms, can undermine the effectiveness of poverty reduction strategies with negative 
repercussions for long-run growth as members of the less-privileged households cannot 
realistically compete with the more-privileged in a market economy. However, Chami et al.
(2005) argue that remittances often result in moral hazards effects as recipients reduce labour
supply and job search efforts. If this proposition holds, remittances can contribute to 
eliminating income inequality among households, assuming it is the rich and not the poor that 
succeed in sponsoring a family member abroad. In either case, in the long run, the income-
equalization effects of remittances cannot be taken for granted because of their intrinsic
positive externalities and trickling down effects on society. Furthermore, international 
remittances do not flow directly to only labour-exporting households, but also to local 
communities2 where they are used mainly to finance social projects, from which the 
economically-disadvantaged naturally derive the most utility.
Adams (1991), in based on a survey of 1000 households in rural Egypt, using income 
data from households with and without migrants to determine the effects of remittances on 
poverty, income distribution and rural development, finds that remittances were important in 
alleviating poverty. However, Adams (1991) concludes that despite the direct poverty-
mitigating effects of international remittances, they also contributed to inequality in the 
distribution of income. Chimhowu et al. (2004) provide evidences in support of the view that 
remittances do increase inequality at a national level, but internationally they transfer 
resources from developed to developing countries, thereby, contributing to reducing income 
inequality. Other similar inequality-mitigating effects of remittances were found by Barham 
9and Boucher (1998) for Nicaragua; Adams (2006) in the case of Ghana; World Bank (2007)
for households in East European and former Soviet Union countries; and Nguyem (2008) for 
Vietnam. 
On the contrary, Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) reveal that in Lesotho, migrant 
remittances do not only reduce poverty but they actually decrease income inequality. For 
Mexico, using National Household Survey Data on income and expenditure for year 2002, 
Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda (2007) find that remittances-recipient households are less likely 
to be poor. Evidences from various cross-country studies including Adams and Page (2005), 
and Acosta et al. (2008) lend support to the fact that remittances directly reduce poverty; 
whilst many more studies including Stark et al. (1986), Taylor (1992), McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007), and Unger (2005) show that remittances directly reduce inequality.
Empirical model, methodological approach and data issues
An important methodological challenge related to modelling the effects of remittances on 
economic development outcomes is endogeneity bias that could arise from reverse causality, 
omitted variable bias and migrants’ self-selection bias of target recipients. In addition, 
remittance inflows do not only affect the socioeconomic welfare of direct recipients but also 
non-migrant households, the business sector, the community and the nation as a whole. To 
circumvent this plausible endogeneity problem, it is important to adopt an econometric 
approach where it is possible to test for endogeneity in the empirical model. Analysts who 
take serious cognizance of this problem often use either instrumental variable techniques or 
dynamic panel-data modelling especially where the data dimension is of larger cross-section3
over time series. Of these two approaches, dynamic panel-data modelling by Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) dominated empirical studies of recent years4; and even where the 
two approaches are used for the sake of robustness, conclusions have been based mainly on 
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results from GMM estimators5. Therefore, to estimate the impact of remittances on poverty 
and income inequality in SSA, this paper relied on a dynamic panel-data modelling by system 
GMM. The system GMM estimation technique developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is 
superior to the conventional difference GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the 
deviation GMM suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) in a number of ways. For example, 
in system GMM, it is possible include time-invariant regressors which tend to disappear in 
difference GMM (Roodman 2006). By allowing for more instruments, the estimated 
parameters of Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM are not only more efficient, but also 
more consistent than the other alternative GMM estimation techniques.
Each estimated model has remittances incorporated into an otherwise standard 
endogenous growth-type economic development model with inspiration from highly-cited 
related studies undertaken by Adams and Page (2005), Acosta et al. (2006; 2007), Gupta et al.
(2009), and Adenutsi (2010). The general empirical model is specified as Equation (1), which 
states that any measure of poverty or inequality ,( )i t in an SSA country i at year t is 
explained by the current remittances per capita received ,( ),i tREM plus a set of other possible 
macroeconomic determinants of  . Mathematically, it is specified that:
, , , , , ,(  or ) ln ln lni t i t i t i t i t t i i tpoverty inequality REM X Z              (1)
where the regressand, , denotes a measure of poverty or income inequality; and REM 
represents remittances per capita. Consistent with the theory underlying endogenous 
economic growth and development framework proposed by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and 
Barro (1990), X is a matrix of uncontrolled exogenous variables viz. an index of poverty or 
inequality as at last year , _1( ),i t real GDP per capita according to purchasing power parity, 
investment in physical capital and openness to international economy. Z is a matrix containing 
the set of principal control variables in related empirical studies such as Acosta et al. (2006; 
2008), Gupta et al. (2009), and Adenutsi (2010). The original elements of Z are human capital 
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accumulation, foreign direct investment, official development assistance, inflation, 
government expenditure, exchange rate, real lending rate, business cycle, adult literacy rate 
and institutional quality. The subscripts i and t are the country and time identities respectively 
whilst t and i are the time-specific and country-fixed effects respectively. The residuals,
which are assumed to be normally distributed with a constant variance and zero mean, take 
into account the unobserved time-variant factors that can influence , .i t A priori, the signs of 
,   and   are indeterminate. The notation ln preceding ,   and R X signifies the natural 
logarithm, whilst each element of Z is in natural logarithm unless otherwise stated in Table 
A1.
A systematic three-stage estimation procedure was carried out; starting with modelling
Equation (1) as specified to determine the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality in 
SSA. For the second-level estimation, a median-dummy variable of the regressand was 
introduced into final estimated Equation (1) obtained through parsimony (with controlled 
variables in contest) at the first level. This median-dummy variable (MDV) is a dichotomous 
variable that takes the value of one if in a particular time period, t, a poverty or income 
inequality index (the specific regressand in context) of a country i exceeds the respective 
median of the sampled countries; otherwise it takes the value of zero. 
Scientifically, ,1,  ln 1,i tMDV if   and 0,   otherwise.MDV if A statistical significance 
of the estimated parameter corresponding to MDV indicates incidence of discriminatory 
impact of remittances within the sample requiring further investigation of the nature into this 
bias. Therefore, where MDV is statistically significant, the study proceeds to the third stage of 
estimation. This is where MDV is replaced with an interacted MDV-remittances, and the 
modified Equation (1) is re-estimated to evaluate the impact of remittances when at any 
particular time a sampled country records a poverty index (or income inequality index as the 
case may be) exceeding the matching median-level index of the sampled countries. The 
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respective computed median used to construct MDV based on the natural logarithm of 
poverty headcount; poverty gap; poverty severity, and income inequality are 3.94051; 
3.08024; 6.16048 and 3.86231.
The two-step system GMM estimation was used because this yields standard errors 
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity (Blundell and Bond 1998). For the joint 
statistical significance of the right-hand side variables in explaining a regressand, the Wald 
statistics was used. The conventional diagnostic tests for the performance of the model carried 
out are the Sargan-Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions to establish the validity of the 
selected instruments; and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced idiosyncratic residuals.
Based strictly on consistent availability of relevant data, 36 SSA countries6 were 
initially sampled for the analysis, but for the models involving poverty, the sample size 
reduced to 34 (excluding Mauritius and Sudan) because of lack of data on poverty indicators. 
In the absence of annual panel data, a 5-year non-overlapping average panel data was used 
essentially because the primary source, the World Bank, does not report on poverty indicators 
annually. The empirical dynamic panel model has a dimension of N T , as 1, 2,3,......,i N
such that 34N  in the case of poverty models but 36N  in the case of income-inequality 
model; and 1, 2,3,...,t T so that, for each empirical poverty and inequality model, 6T  .
Poverty headcount ratio, poverty gap index which measures the depth and incidence of 
poverty, and squared poverty gap as a proxy for poverty severity are the indicators of poverty 
used in this study whilst the Gini index was used to measure income inequality. The 
definition, specific measurement and main source of the variables are outlined in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. 
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Empirical results and discussions
The empirical results of this study are reported in Table 2. The number of observations in 
each estimated poverty model was 169, whilst that of income inequality is 175. The number 
instruments used in each of the estimated models (poverty headcount, poverty gap, poverty 
severity and income inequality) was 25. At one percent level of statistical significance, the 
Wald statistics suggest that the explanatory variables jointly explain total variations in the 
dependent variable in each of the estimated models. The Arellano-Bond test statistics and the 
Sargan-Hansen statistics indicate that, at the conventional levels of statistical significance, 
none of the estimated model is inefficient. This is because the instruments used in the system 
GMM estimations are valid and there are no autocorrelations in the first-difference residuals 
in any of the estimated models.
At five percent level of statistical significance7, international migrant remittance inflows 
impacted negatively on all dimensions of poverty, (-0.02174, -0.02919, and -0.05839 for 
poverty headcount, poverty gap and poverty severity respectively), in SSA between 1980 and 
2009. This implies that, a percentage increase in international remittance inflows per capita
reduced the number persons living on less than US$1.25 per day by approximately 0.022
percent in SSA between 1980 and 2009. During this same period, a similar increase in 
remittances per capita reduced poverty gap by at least 0.029 percent, while the severity of 
poverty reduced by about 0.058 percent in a typical labour-exporting SSA country. The 
findings of this study, thus, point to the fact that, as far as macroeconomic factors are 
concerned, international migrant remittances received through official channels have 
significant poverty alleviating effects in SSA. Indeed, besides higher human capital 
accumulation, investment in physical assets, and real income per capita, international migrant 
remittances have the most consistent and significant economic impact on poverty alleviation 
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Table 2: Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in SSA (1980-2009)
Group variable: Ccode Time variable: 5-Year Average
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure
Poverty 
Headcount
Poverty 
Gap
Poverty 
Severity
Income 
Inequality
Lagged dependent variable 1.05056 0.83226 0.83226 0.91124
(31.51)*** (7.21)*** (7.21)*** (11.22)***
Remittances (lnREMPC) -0.02174 -0.02919 -0.05839 -0.00137
(-3.04)*** (-2.07)** (-2.07)** (-0.27)
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) ……….. -0.32159 -0.64317 -0.03344
……….. (-5.14)*** (-5.14)*** (-2.06)**
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) -0.03048 -0.07481 -0.14963 0.07417
(-0.55) (-2.18)*** (-2.18)*** (2.85)
Investment in physical assets (lnINV) 0.08624 -0.17023 -0.34047 0.06799
(1.73)* (-2.20)** (-2.20)** (2.77)***
Foreign direct investment (FDI) -0.01778 ……….. ……….. ………..
(-3.30)** ……….. ……….. ………..
Official development assistance (lnODA) 0.01949 0.06708 0.13415 -0.02001
(0.82) (1.93)* (1.93)* (-2.97)***
Trade openness (lnOPN) -0.13505 0.04169 0.08338 -0.13591
(-1.80)* (0.42) (0.42) (-2.88)***
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.00123 0.00046 0.00917 ………..
(-2.22)** (0.71) (0.71) ………..
Government expenditure (lnGXP) 0.29931 0.61328 1.22655 ………..
(4.10)*** (5.49)*** (5.49)*** ………..
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) 0.01586 0.03537 0.07073 -0.02900
(0.53) (0.61) (0.61) (-1.76)*
Business cycle (BZC) ……….. ……….. ……….. -0.00902
……….. ……….. ……….. (-5.75)***
Institutional quality (INS) ……….. ……….. ……….. 0.00353
……….. ……….. ……….. (1.23)
Constant term -0.58598 0.24427 0.48854 0.49255
(-1.03) (0.30) (0.30) (1.39)
Number of observations 169 169 169 175
Number of groups 34 34 34 36
Number of instruments 25 25 25 25
Wald 2
[ ],  [11],17667.07*** [11],2518.00*** [11],2518.00*** [10],596.03***
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):
     -5.186{0.604}     0.7467{0.455}     0.7467{0.455} -0.0169{0.987}
Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions:
2
[13 ],      16.0871 20.0526 20.0526 11.4423
Source: Author’s estimation */**/*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
z-statistics are in ( ), z-probabilities are { }
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in SSA. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the fact that human capital accumulation 
and investment in physical assets, although had the most significant poverty-alleviating 
effects in SSA between 1980 and 2009, unlike real income per capita and international 
remittances, these two factors failed to have any significant impact on poverty headcount.
At conventional levels of statistical significance, this study has shown that, generally, 
remittances do not impact income inequality in SSA (Table 2); yet, when the level of income 
inequality is above the group median, migrant remittances do aggravate income inequality 
more significantly (Table 3). Therefore, even if remittances contribute to bridging the income 
gap between the South and the North, among labour-exporting developing countries such as 
those in SSA, this study has shown that, alas, they do entrench income inequality.
In Table 3, the finding further shows that the poverty-alleviating effects of remittances differ 
across SSA countries, using the group median-level indicators of poverty as a reference point. 
With statistically significant coefficients of 0.0452, 0.0750 and 0.1500 for poverty headcount, 
poverty gap and poverty severity respectively, the study reveals that, when the incidence of 
poverty by any measure is above the median level, official remittances received aggravate 
poverty, at least, internationally8. This may be due to the fact that, as shown in Table A2, the 
poorest SSA countries in terms of GDP per capita, such as Burundi, Congo Republic, 
Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda, receive the least official remittances per capita. Besides, even 
in the 2000-2009 decade when SSA received the highest amount of remittances, no country 
could receive even up to US$1 per day, as Cape Verde (the highest recipient) received only 
US$249.88 per annum9. This seems to justify the apprehension of remittance-pessimists that 
severely poor families would normally not have the means to sponsor migrants to high-
income countries to enable them directly benefit from international migration by way of
remittances. To the extent that remittances generally have direct and instantaneous poverty-
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mitigating effect in SSA, the findings of this study are consistent with the results obtained in 
related previous studies including Adams and Page (2005), López-Córdova (2005), Acosta et 
al. (2006), Gupta et al. (2009), Kalim and Shahbaz (2009), and Gubert et al. (2010).
Table 3: Comparative Analysis of Remittance Effects on Poverty and Inequality in SSA
Type of Dummy Effect Poverty Headcount Poverty Gap Poverty Severity Income Inequality
Independent Median 0.1415 (2.83)*** 0.2620 (4.73)*** 0.5240 (4.73)*** 0.1388 (6.27)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive 0.0452 (2.67)** 0.0750 (4.40)*** 0.1500 (4.40)*** 0.0357 (4.09)***
Number of observations 169 169 169 175
Number of groups 34 34 34 36
Instruments 26 26 26 25
Wald (χ²₍₀₎) [12],  9448.46*** [12],  1240.28*** [12],  1240.28*** [11],  486.67***
Arellano-Bond Test -0.8852{0.3760} 0.7114{0.4769} 0.7114{0.4769} 0.1813{0.8561}
Sargan-Hansen Test (χ² ₁₃) 12.5386 18.8135 18.8135 11.5240
Source: Author’s estimation Note: **(***) denote statistical significance at 5(1) percent respectively
          z-statistics in ( ); z-probabilities in { }
To a large extent, this result is consistent with Nguyen (2008), and Ekebe and Le Goff (2009) 
that although remittances reduce poverty, they are less inequality-mitigating. The findings of 
this study also seem to support earlier conclusions drawn by Acosta et al. (2007) for 10 LAC 
countries and Gubert et al. (2010) for Mali; that, remittances either reduce or have no effects 
on income equality. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Based on the above empirical findings, this study concludes that, in SSA, remittances have 
huge potentials for promoting economic development by way helping to reduce poverty but 
not necessarily income inequality. The main implications of this conclusion10 are that 
remittances contributed to poverty alleviation in SSA over the past three decades, but the 
optimal contribution of remittances to socioeconomic development of SSA has not been fully 
realised mainly because the sub-region failed to mobilise adequate remittances from its 
migrants. Consequently, there is the need to attract higher remittances in order to realise the 
optimal developmental-impact of remittances in SSA. In addition, governments and 
policymakers in SSA must pursue complementary development strategies towards 
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empowering the economically-disadvantaged and the vulnerable group to reduce poverty and 
income inequality. For example, because higher human capital accumulation by way of 
improved secondary school enrolment has consistent poverty and income inequality 
mitigating effects, non-discriminatory access to higher education policies such as free 
education up to the secondary level could be essential in eliminating poverty and income 
inequality more permanently. Policymakers can also encourage formation of vibrant and 
progressive migrant hometown associations in all major migrant host countries as a means to 
mobilising more remittances to finance development projects at the community levels, so that 
the direct benefits of the poor from remittances can be enhanced.
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Table A1: Data Description, Measurement and Sources
VARIABLE NOTATION DESCRIPTION, MEASUREMENT AND MAIN SOURCES
Dependent Variables: Poverty & Income Inequality 
Poverty headcount lnPovH Share of the population living on less than US$1.25 per day at 2005 
international prices. Source: WDI.
Poverty gap lnPovG The mean shortfall from the poverty line1 (counting the non-poor as 
having zero shortfall) expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. 
Source: WDI.
Poverty severity lnPovS Squared value of the PovG. Source: Author’s computation based on WDI.
Income Inequality lnGini Gini index measuring the extent to which the distribution of income (or 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Source: WDI.
Explanatory and Control Variables
Remittances per 
capita
lnREMPC The sum of workers’ remittances and compensation of employees as ratio 
of population. Sources: WDI, BoPS, MRF-2011 CD-ROMs and e-
databases and estimates based on country-specific information obtained 
from country-desk officials of the IMF and the World Bank.
Real GDP per 
capita PPP
lnY_PPP+/- GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2005 
international prices in US dollars. Sources: WDI and WEO.
Human capital 
accumulation
lnHCA Net enrolment ratio of children of official school age based on 
International Standard Classification of Education 1997 who enrolled in 
post-primary school relative to the population of the corresponding 
official school age. Source: WDI.
Investment in 
physical assets
lnINV+/- Gross fixed capital formation as a ratio to nominal GDP. Sources: WDI
and WEO.
Inflation rate INF+/- Rate of growth in annual average of consumer price index. Source: WDI
and author based on IFS and WEO.
Real exchange rate lnRXR+/- The annual average value of the national currency of a sampled SSA 
country in real terms of the national currency of USA. Computed as a 
multiplication of nominal exchange rate by the ratio of host-country CPI 
to the USA CPI. Source: WDI and author based on IFS and WEO.
Government 
expenditure
lnGXP+/- Central government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of 
nominal GDP. Sources: Author based on WDI, IFS and WEO.
Business Cycle BZC+/- Annual growth in real GDP. Sources: Author based on WDI, IFS and
WEO.
Real lending rate RLR+/- Average annual rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus 
the annual rate of inflation. Sources: Author based on WDI, IFS and 
WEO.
Openness to 
international trade
lnOPN+/- Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of nominal GDP. Sources: 
Author’s computation based on WDI and WEO.
Foreign direct 
investment
FDI+/- Net inflows of investment, being the sum of equity capital, reinvestment 
of profits, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, to acquire long-
term management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other 
than that of the investor, expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP. 
Sources: Author based on WDI and WEO.
Official 
development 
assistance
lnODA+/- Disbursement flows (net of repayments) from official donors to a country 
as a percentage of nominal GDP. Source: WDI.
Institutional 
quality
INS+/- A polity2 index used to capture the qualities/standards of democratic 
governance and institutions in a typical home SSA country. It ranges 
between -10 for low democratic governance (including dictatorship and 
autocratic governance regimes) and weak institutions, and +10 for high 
democratic governance and institutions. Source: Marshall and Jaggers 
(2011).
Source: Author based on February 2011 editions of WDI, WEO and IFS were primarily used. The a priori sign 
is indicated by +/- by the notation column of each variable.
                                                          
1 The World Bank defines poverty line as the annual cost of obtaining the standardised minimum daily caloric 
2172 requirement of 2172 calories per person plus basic non-food essential items such as food and education.
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Table A2:Current Migrant Remittance-Dependent Countries in SSA, 2000-2009
A: Top-10 Remittance per capita  Recipients B: Top-10 Dependent Countries (as % of GDP) C: Top-10 Dependent Countries (in US$'m)
Rank Country (remittances per capita  in US$) Rank Country ( %  share of GDP) Rank Country (remittances in US$ millions)
1 Cape Verde (249.28) 1 Lesotho (28.73) 1 Nigeria (4,465.23)
2 Mauritius (170.62) 2 Cape Verde (12.68) 2 Sudan (1,504.21)
3 Lesotho (164.94) 3 Gambia (9.24) 3 Kenya (957.81)
4 Seychelles (89.09) 4 Liberia (8.87) 4 Senegal (777.32)
5 Swaziland (68.93) 5 Togo (8.52) 5 South Africa (583.74)
6 Senegal (67.17) 6 Senegal (8.43) 6 Uganda (427.62)
7 Botswana (41.12) 7 Guinea-Bissau (5.28) 7 Lesotho (329.06)
8 Sudan (38.15) 8 Sudan (5.22) 8 Mali (217.69)
9 Gambia (31.00) 9 Uganda (4.62) 9 Mauritius (210.82)
10 Togo (30.81) 10 Kenya (4.58) 10 Togo (188.66)
A: Bottom-10 Remittance per capita  Recipients B: Bottom-10 Dependent Countries (as % of GDP) C: Bottom-10 Dependent Countries (in US$'m)
Rank Country (remittances per capita  in US$) Rank Country ( %  share of GDP) Rank Country (remittances in US$ millions)
1 Ghana (3.76) 1 Cameroon (0.54) 1 Madagascar (13.35)
2 Congo, Rep. (3.51) 2 South Africa (0.27) 2 Namibia (13.24)
3 Mozambique (3.44) 3 Madagascar (0.26) 3 Comoros (11.93)
4 Rwanda (3.11) 4 Congo, Rep. (0.23) 4 Congo, Rep. (11.89)
5 Ethiopia (2.11) 5 Namibia (0.22) 5 Gabon (8.16)
6 Madagascar (0.78) 6 Mauritania (0.12) 6 Seychelles (7.54)
7 Mauritania (0.68) 7 Burundi (0.11) 7 Mauritania (2.00)
8 Tanzania (0.38) 8 Tanzania (0.11) 8 Sao Tome & Principe (1.48)
9 Burundi (0.16) 9 Gabon (0.10) 9 Burundi (1.29)
10 Malawi (0.07) 10 Malawi (0.03) 10 Malawi (0.92)
Source: Author
                                                          
1 For definition of these poverty measures, refer to Table A1 in the Appendix.
2 See for example, Diatta and Mbow (1999) in the case of Senegal.
3 Number of sampled countries is 34 for poverty models and 36 for inequality model based on availability of 
data. 
4 Some of these studies are Acosta et al. (2007; 2008; 2009), Jongwanich (2007), and Adenutsi and Ahortor 
(2010).
5 See, for example, Aggarwal et al. (2006), and Jongwanich (2007).
6 List of sampled countries are presented in Table 1.
7 The estimated coefficient of international migrant remittance inflows per capita on poverty headcount was, in 
fact, significant at one percent statistical level.
8 The poverty line used in this study is based on international caloric requirement based on PPP, therefore, 
remittances can actually reduce poverty at national levels in both category of countries (which is outside the 
scope of this study), but not in terms of comparative international terms (as revealed by this study).
9 No SSA country received up to US$1 per day in migrant remittances per capita since the highest recipient, 
Cape Verde, received a mere US$249.28 which is far less than US$365.25, representing US$1 per day.
10 It is important to note that, with regard to the conclusions based on distributive effects of the comparative 
analyses in particular, given that higher unofficial remittances are more likely to be received in poorer countries 
with weaker institutions and financial infrastructure, the developmental impact of remittances in these countries 
could be underestimated if only official remittances are used, as in this the case of study, because data on 
unofficial remittances are not available over the study period and across the sampled countries.
